Out of Focus:
Helping Flight Deck Directors Optimize Their Night Vision Goggles

Introduction

The United States Coast Guard operates a fleet of cutters (ships) and helicopters. Shipboard helicopter operations at night are supervised by a Landing Signals Officer (LSO) who wears night vision goggles (NVGs). A performance failure during helicopter operations could result in the loss of a multi-million dollar aircraft, extensive fire damage to the cutter, and personnel injury or fatality. The risk of failure is greatly reduced through proper use of NVGs. Although goggles became standard equipment for helicopter operations in 2001, many flight deck directors are unable to focus their NVGs. This study examines why NVGs worn by LSOs are not properly focused.

Sources of Analysis Information

Operator analysis: The LSO is one of the most critical members of the flight operations team, and must completely understand a highly complex set of rules while manipulating technical equipment and directing the flight deck team.  Training for duty as an LSO is normally reserved for strong leaders with high intelligence. They can understand detailed instructions, have no physical limitations, and accurately forecast the consequences of improper actions. When not supervising flight operations, an LSO is responsible for other duties, such as standing alert duty on the bridge, supervising vessel inspections, or managing a division.

Environment analysis: NVGs are used at night, aboard moving ships, while under helicopter rotors blowing salt spray. Space to put on and focus NVGs is limited.  Users do not have access to computer-based job aids while actually using the equipment and must rely on memory for proper use.

Equipment analysis: A set of NVGs has two image intensifier tubes, each with a focus control for objective and diopter adjustment. The NVG also has alignment controls for interpupilary distance, tilt angle, vertical position, and distance from the eyes. Each cutter has three sets of aviation-rated NVGs. Focus calibration equipment exists but is not normally installed on cutters.

Literature review: The Shipboard-Helicopter Operational Procedures (SHOPs) manual contains detailed procedures required for safe helicopter operations. The manual also details use of equipment but has limited information about NVGs. Each set of NVGs includes a small user manual which covers basic care of the NVGs. Service periodicals have included articles which cover proper focus techniques for NVGs.

Organizational controls analysis: Each cutter receives a bi-annual Standardization (STAN) inspection visit. Cutter personnel take a battery of objective exams, but the exams have no questions about NVG focusing. STAN inspection teams inspect NVGs during each inspection, and find more than 50% of NVG kits have some sort of mechanical problem.  Spot checks of NVGs show LSOs are using unfocussed goggles in almost 100% of the cases.

Defining the Gaps: Optimals vs Actuals

Twenty LSOs from three cutter classes were interviewed about NVG use. Seven Coast Guard STAN Instructors were also interviewed about NVG operation in the shipboard environment. Four STAN instructors were also helicopter pilots with extensive NVG experience in the aviation environment. Members of this audience were asked what the optimal performance would look like, and then asked to describe the actual performance. The interviews identified five major gaps in the process of properly focusing NVGs:

Optimal conditions:

Actual conditions:

1) LSO can focus NVGs correctly.

1) LSO cannot focus NVGs.

2) Each cutter equipped with NVG focus calibration gear.

2) No NVG focus calibration gear on cutters.

3) LSO focuses NVGs before every flight operation.

3) LSO neglects to focus NVGs before flight operations.

4) LSO is motivated to have perfectly focused NVGs.

4) LSO not motivated to focus NVGs.

5) NVGs focus controls work smoothly.

5) NVGs controls broken or stiff.

Finding Causes for the Gaps

1) LSO cannot focus NVGs: 100% of LSOs stated their NVG training had been given "on the job" by a more experienced LSO. Over half stated they tried to find written material that described focusing procedures but were unsuccessful. All stated the infrequency of flight operations made them "rusty" with the NVG focus controls.

2) No NVG calibration gear on cutters: All Air Stations recognize the critical need for perfectly focused NVGs, and have NVG calibration equipment available. A cutter with a helicopter is essentially a floating Air Station. Calibration gear costs $10,000. Cutters are required to purchase such gear from their own funds. NVG focus without the gear is regarded as "good enough", and none of the surveyed cutters have purchased the gear. To date, "good enough" focus has not led to any serious or costly mishaps. However, the organizational cost to put a calibration set on each of 40 cutters is well below the cost of replacing an aircraft or cutter.

3) LSO neglects to focus NVGs before flight operations: LSOs stated flight operations happen "at the last minute" and there is time for only a quick focus adjustment. Each cutter has only three sets of NVGs. Many LSOs use the same set, so they cannot pre-adjust "their" set. Most LSOs have other duties, so even when flight operations are planned, they cannot pre-adjust NVGs and set them aside. NVGs are expensive, and must remain in their cases until starting flight operations or risk damage from ship movement.

4) LSO not motivated to focus NVGs: Sixteen (80%) of the LSOs regarded "field focus" of the NVGs to be adequate for safe flight operations. All LSOs agreed NVG focus was important for safe flight operations, but without an easy, quick way to focus the NVGs, adequate was "good enough". Most surveyed LSOs have never operated with properly focused NVGs. In effect, they have never known the advantages of a proper focus, so consider time spent focusing of little value.

5) NVG controls broken or stiff: All LSOs stated many of the NVG controls had become stiff through salt-water corrosion and lack of maintenance. Some cutters had an individual assigned to maintain the NVGs, but none of them had received instruction about care of the NVGs. NVGs were sent to each ship with no directions, no systematic controls to cover periodic maintenance, and no instruction where to send broken NVGs for repair. A central repair facility is staffed to repair NVGs but has never published their existence to the cutters.

Recommendations for Solution Systems

1) Formal training for new LSOs should emphasize standard focusing procedures. To help achieve the optimal condition where the LSO can focus NVGs correctly, we recommend a self-guided multimedia program or website to teach NVG terminology and demonstrate sequenced focusing steps. The program should also be adaptable to "just in time" or refresher training. Bi-annual examinations should test knowledge of NVG focusing procedures. The SHOPs manual should include a section describing NVG terminology and focusing procedures.

2) To achieve the optimal condition where each cutter is equipped with NVG focus calibration gear, we recommend Headquarters purchase NVG calibration equipment for each cutter and supervise its installation.

3) Time management and leadership discrepancies are beyond the scope of this analysis. However, access to conveniently placed calibration gear would enable a much better focus with minimal additional time required. To assist in achieving the optimal condition where the LSO focuses NVGs before every flight operation, we recommend Headquarters purchase NVG calibration equipment for each cutter and supervise its installation. We also recommend trainers demonstrate advantages and use of the calibration equipment.

4) To achieve the optimal condition where the LSO is motivated to have perfectly focused NVGs, we recommend initial and refresher training which emphasizes the advantages of proper NVG focus, and demonstrates that "good enough" focus isn't safe. A laminated placard should be developed that assists operators with critical procedural steps for focusing their NVGs.

5) To achieve the optimal condition where the NVGs focus controls work smoothly, we recommend refresher training include field maintenance instruction for the NVG maintainers, including salt spray mitigation. We also recommend the central NVG repair facility develop a process to cycle NVGs for bi-annual overhaul.

Role for Job Aids

The sources of analysis information revealed that helicopter operations often occur at the last minute, out in the weather, with no way to access a computer-based refresher about focusing NVGs. The analysis also indicated that no calibration gear was installed on the cutters. A laminated card displaying a bulleted focusing procedure with diagrams would be useful for last-minute use, would not require a computer, and would be immune to damage by salt spray. Alternately, a placard placed near the NVG focusing area would summarize the focusing procedure and provide motivation for proper use.

Conclusion

This study explored why NVGs worn by LSOs are not properly focused. The operator, environment, equipment, literature, and organizational controls were considered in the analysis of source material. To define the gap between optimal and actual performance, interviews were conducted with representatives of the target audience. Causes for the gaps were investigated, and recommendations made to help the LSOs achieve the optimal performance. An interim job aid was proposed to assist LSOs with last minute focus adjustments. If recommendations proposed in this study are implemented, NVGs worn by LSOs will be better focused and contribute to safer flight operations.